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ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITY 
I. THE AFFIDAVIT OF AVNER KALAY CLEARLY RAISED AN ISSUE OF A 
MATERIAL FACT. IF THE DENIAL OF THE MOTION TO STRIKE THE 
AFFIDAVIT WAS NOT AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION, THE CASE SHOULD BE 
REMANDED TO THE DISTRICT COURT FOR TRIAL ON THE MERITS. 
Paragraph 14 of Avner Kalay's affidavit states that "the fair value of Mr. 
Borghetti's shares at the time of the merger was between $4.2 million and $6,706 
million." (R. 4645). 
The Defendants address that by arguing that the only valid approach to arriving at 
the fair value of a dissenter's shares under Deleware 8 Del C. §262, is to "to value the 
corporation itself, as distinguished from a fraction of its shares as they may exist in the 
hands of a particular shareholder." LeBeau v. M.G. Corp., Inc., 1998 Del. Ch. LEXIS 9, 
7. 
The quote from LeBeau, taken out of context, appears to support the Defendants' 
position. However, like the many other cases with similar quotes, in context, the meaning 
of the quote is made clear. In LeBeau, the court was determining whether the expert 
valuation of Robert Reilly was permissible. The court rule it impermissible on the basis 
that "Reilly's capital market valuation method is impermissible because it includes a 
built-in minority discount." Id. 
Like all other cases discussing the valuation of the companies in Delaware 
appraisal actions, the principal expressed is that neither minority interest discounts nor 
control interest premiums are allowed in the calculation of the fair value of the shares. To 
interpret the quote in accord with Defendant's position would directly contradict the plain 
language of the statute which reads "the Court shall determine the fair market value of the 
shares..." 8 Del C. §262. 
Further, it is clear that Dr. Kalay was valuing the entire company via a 
methodology that determines the value of all of the common shares in the company. "The 
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value of the common stocks, as described in the fifth column of Table 7 is $46.64 million 
and the damages to Mr. Borghetti (including 8% prejudgment interest rate) are $8.6 
million. (R. 3247, Exh. C, at 17). He then checks his calculation by adding the common 
shares figure he reached to the figure for the preferred shares and arrives at the correct 
market value. 
The Defendants do not assert, nor could they assert, that Dr. Kalay's opinion 
applied either discounts or premiums to any block of the common shares. The expert 
report of Avner Kalay (R. 3247, Exh. C), at pages 27 and 28 clearly is valuing 100% of 
the equity of the common stocks. 
Thus, Dr. Kalay was valuing the entire company and from those calculations 
derived the fair value of Mr. Borghetti's shares. That is precisely the procedure required 
under the statute. The fact that in his affidavit he reduced the figure down to only Mr. 
Borghetti's proportional share (including interest) simply carried the analysis to its 
terminating point: actual damages. 
If any of the opinions lack credibility it is both of the Defendants' expert's reports. 
They both found the fair value of Mr. Borghetti's shares to be zero. It simply is not 
possible for shares in a going concern with even the slightest possibility of success to be 
worth nothing. 
There can be no question that Mr. Borghetti's shares had a value. But for the 
improper merger, the company had the potential of continued growth and profits. At the 
time of the merger the company had $15.1 million in cash and cash equivalents. (R. 
3247, Exh. C , at 7). Even had the company continued to lose money (as technology start 
up companies often do), it had sufficient capital to continue. Id. 
The statutes and the cases recognize the need to protect common shareholders' 
interests. The statute states that the appraisal is conducted to determine the fair value of 
the dissenter's shares. The cases state that "fundamentally, a Delaware court must 
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employ a liberalized approach to valuation embracing "proof of value by any techniques 
or methods which are generally considered acceptable in the financial community." See, 
i.e. Weinberger v. UOP. Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983). 
The appeal on the appraisal issue (as to both groups of Defendants) can be 
summarized into two competing views. 
First, Mr. Borghetti's position that all shares in an ongoing company have some 
value and if they are cancelled in a merger or liquidation the share holder is entitled to be 
compensated. 
Second, the Defendants' position that if a discounted cash flow analysis or market 
analysis shows that the current value of the entire company is less than a preference 
amount, the company, its directors, and the controlling shareholder may sell the company 
to the controlling shareholder, receive compensation for their decision, pay the rest to the 
preferred shareholders (who held two of the three positions on the 
"independent"committee that approved the merger) and leave the small common 
shareholders with nothing. 
The inequity of the second view, that those in control can take something of clear 
value without compensation therefor, mandates adoption of the first view. Mr. Borghetti 
is entitled to some compensation. 
II. IT WAS NOT AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION FOR THE DISTRICT COURT 
TO DENY THE DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STRIKE THE AFFIDAVIT OF 
AVNER KALAY. THERE WAS A MORE THAN SUFFICIENT SHOWING 
THAT THE METHODOLOGY IS GENERALLY ACCEPTED AND RELIABLE. 
This Court reviews the denial of the SCT Defendants' motion to strike the expert 
testimony of Avner Kalay for an abuse of discretion. InreG.B., 2002 UT 270, f^lO, 53 
P.3d963. 
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In Weinberger v. UOP, Inc. 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983), the Delaware Supreme 
Court explicitly broadened the interpretation of the Delaware Corporations Code, section 
262 on appraisal rights, and adopted a more liberal approach to the valuation process (Id, 
at 704). The Court concluded that an exclusive method for valuation was outmoded and a 
more liberal approach to stock valuation and appraisal proceedings must include proof of 
value by any techniques or methods which are generally considered acceptable in the 
financial community (Id. at 712). They held that the most popularly employed techniques 
for valuation no longer exclusively control appraisal and valuation proceedings, and that 
alternative valuation techniques should be allowed. (Id. at 713; See also, Cede & Co. v. 
Technicolor Inc. 684 A.2d 289, 296-297 (Del. 1996)). The Court in Weinberger further 
concluded that when determining the value that the stockholder is entitled to be paid for 
that which has been taken from him, a number of relevant factors are to be included. The 
Court stated: 
In determining what figure represents [the] true or intrinsic value, the 
appraiser and the courts must take into consideration all factors and 
elements which reasonably might enter into the fixing of value. Thus, 
market value, asset value, dividends, earning prospects, the nature of the 
enterprise and any other facts which were known or which could be 
ascertained. . . This is not only in accord with the realities of present day 
affairs, but it is thoroughly consonant with the purpose and intent of our 
statutory law. 
(Id. at 713). 
So not only are the valuation methods that are accepted to be liberally construed by 
the Courts, but it is the Court's opinion according to Weinberger that all the relevant 
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factors shoi lid be inch ided when determining value as well (See Also. Cede_& Co at 
295'). Market value is simply a factor to be used and in fact the Black-Scholes method 
used by Kalay utilized market value as a factor, 
. ' ' I'IJII h<ii JIM>» adopted ,i l)itKHl and iibtTii! nilcrpc'lilH'^i "»f il" > 'huluii mlbinis 
that are allowed, in Bingham Consolidation. Co v Groesbeck 105 P.3d 365 (Ct.App. 
Utah (20041 the Utah Court of Appeals stated that the goal of appraiser is to ascertain the 
actual wort!. ^. ^;H which the dissentei loses , , . there are no uxcu methods for valuating 
the financial community. (Id. at 370, citing Qakridge Energy Inc. v. Clifton 937 P.2d 
130, 132 (Utah 1997), See also, Paskill Corp, v. Alcoma Corp. 7An A.2d 549, 556 (Del. 
2000)). They concluded tiiat they are in agreement with other junsdiciions ina . , - • i; 
$• • ' . p e i a l • - * • ' > *>• 
community." (Bingham at 375, See also, Paskill Corp. at 556). 
Kalay's use of the Black-Scholes Model, simply because it is an alternative 
method, cannot be excluded because it is clear!) a general!) accepted pi inciple and 
1
 The Court, in Cede Co, \ I echnicolor. Inc. cited and follow ed VV einbergei few: the 
proposition that the CR.''" nust broaden the process for determining fair vah le, and 
factors that are not the product of speculation may be considered when 
determining value, including the nature of the enterprise (Cede Co, v. Technicolor, 
Inc. (!>)%» f<iS4 • \ Jd JN" JM5). 
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technique in the financial community. Scholes and Merton shared the 1997 Nobel Prize 
in economics for their work on the development of this formula. (Brealey, Richard A., 
and Stuart C. Myers, and Alan J. Marcus. Fundamentals of Corporate Finance, 4th Ed. 
New York: McGraw Hill Companies, Inc., 2004, page 651, (excerpt attached to R. 5306, 
Exhibit W). The field of finance has developed a variety of option pricing models with 
the fundamental ones being the binomial model and the Black-Scholes model option 
pricing models. Over time, these models and their extensions have been used in a variety 
of evaluative settings (Benaroch, Michel and Robert Kauffman. (1999) "A Case for 
Using Real Options Pricing Analysis to Evaluate Information Technology Project 
Investments." Information Systems Research, Vol. 10, No.l :70-86, (excerpt attached to 
R. 5306, Exhibit X). 
The literature on the Black-Scholes model and its uses in the finance community is 
overwhelming. It is a formula that has been in use for over 30 years, applicable to a 
number of evaluations. It has not only been utilized in valuing options, but has been used 
to value equity and debt in a company. (See generally, Damodaran, Aswath. Investment 
Valuation: Tools and Techniques for Determining the Value of Any Asset, 2nd Ed. New 
York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 1996, page 828-829). 
The Black-Scholes technique is frequently cited and written about as a valuation 
method for businesses and technologies based on option theory and the method takes into 
account a number of complexities and nuances that affect the value of a company that 
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other traditional methods do not. It is a valid method when valuing a firm in distress and 
also accounts for a firm's flexibility, and has become a very popular approach to 
vaiuauo?.. ;Ncc„ Lyocr. Peter i The Real Options Solution: ringing Iotal vajuc in a nign 
Copeland, T., Koller, "I ., Muniii, J. Valuation: Measuring ^ ~ AUug^ing the Value of 
Companies. McKinsey & Company. !*•.; New York, NY '994. page 399; See Also, 
Damodara:;. . ^ .* .ui: i ne IOSI 01 uisiress: Survival, Truncation RISK and V aluation. 
J a m "•'''!-.--
 t . ' 
It is clearly a generally accepted, frequently cited and utilized method of valuation 
in the financial communis T" has achieved status in the financial community as being 
one i • ' . ' ! . • * I ::i ii tl lei moi e, Defendant s 
expert Grabowski in his expert report of May 3 i, 2006 pointed out this exact contention. 
He stated that, "The Black-Scholes option pricing model is widely accepted in the 
financial community as a methodology to estimate the price of an option, or derivative 
h •.' '. • mi mi 1 i I s be mil ii'iil in iTTLiin msliiiK i i. In mm nul flu \, i I mi H nf tin iruunh ol 
a company under financial distress.'*
 v^- ->2475 Hx A. Grabowski Report at p. i-r>. 
Pursuant to both Delaware and Utah law those formulas and techniques which are 
generally accepted in the financial community are now clearl) allowed by the t omts, 
Black-Scholes method is widely accepted and utilized in the financial community, not 
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only for the valuing of options but as a valuation technique for equity as well, Professor 
Kalay's testimony utilizing this methodology was clearly admissible and the district court 
properly denied the Defendants' motion to strike. 
The cases relied on by the Defendants in their cross appeal are easily 
distinguished. Snyder v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 93 T.C. 529 (1989) concerns 
the valuation of a company, "Libbyfam," which was organized as a personal holding 
company, and its sole asset was 300 shares of common stock in W.L. Gore & Associates, 
Inc. ('Gore'), a publicly traded corporation. In that case, decided in 1989, the tax court 
rejected the Black-Scholes model because it was being applied to a personal holding 
corporation. The shares were wholly owned by the tax payer who then created an 
irrevocable trust for the benefit of her great-grandchildren and funded it with 1,000 of her 
3,951 total shares of common stock in Libbyfam. 
Everyone of the articles and books cited by Dr. Kalay in his affidavit to show that 
the Black-Scholes method for valuing common stock is generally accepted and reliable 
was published long after the tax court decision. With one exception they were all 
published at least ten years later. 
More importantly, Campus Pipeline had substantially more shareholders than one 
woman and her great-grandchildren. 
In In re Med Diversified Inc.. 334 B.R. 89 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2005), the expert 
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whose opinion was found impermissible (Mr. Peltz) specifically testified: "Vm not a 
certified valuation expert, and I don't issue valuation reports." Further, as to his opinion 
applying the Black-Scholes Method for valuing a six and a half month "option" for 
acquiring 100% of the privately held shares of Addus, the court stated it was "not 
prepared to embark on a cruise down this unexplored river in the heart of the jungle in 
order to discover the application of this Method outside the principal context in which it 
has been customarily applied." and "The Black-Scholes Method has simply not been 
shown to provide a reliable measure of the value of an option to purchase 100% of 
controlled shares in a privately held company and the parties failed to set forth any 
credible evidence otherwise." 
In this case, the Plaintiffs submitted substantial evidence that the Black-Scholes 
Method was used to value shares in financially stressed companies like Campus Pipeline. 
(R. 4645 at 7-15). Unlike Mr. Peltz, Dr. Kalay has extensive credentials.2 
2Avner Kalay is a professor at the David Eccles School of Business at the University of 
Utah where he teaches courses in valuation. He received his B.A. in economics from Tel Aviv 
University, a Masters in Business Administration from the University of Rochester and a PhD in 
Business Administration from the University of Rochester. Professor Kalay was a professor of 
finance at Tel Aviv University and was a member of NYU's business school faculty and was 
tenured at NYU in 1985; NYU's finance department has been consistently ranked among the top 
5 in the world. Professor Kalay has published numerous articles in leading finance journals and 
Kalay formerly worked as a consultant for the SEC. (R. 4645) 
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The case In re Apple Computer. Inc. Sec. Litig.. 243 F.Supp. 2d 1012, 1028 (N.D. 
Cal. 2002), stands for the sole proposition that a Black-Scholes analysis can not be used 
to explain the selling patterns of insiders, and thereby show scienter in a securities fraud 
case. It has no relevance to this litigation. Neither do the cases applying Black-Scholes 
to child support or the significance of a benefit achieved at settlement for use in setting 
the size of the attorneys fees awarded. 
In Orban v. Field. 1997 WL 153831 (Del.Ch. 1997), the preferred shareholders 
had a contractual right to vote for a liquidation. Here the preferred shareholders never 
contracted for such rights. This is critical, since the rights of preferred stock are largely 
contractual in nature and ordinarily courts should enforce the terms of the contract, not 
invent new ones for which the parties did not bargain. HB Korenvaes Investments. L.P. 
v. Marriott Corporation. 1993 WL 257422 (Del.Ch. 1993). In Orban the common 
shareholder that later objected to the sale (Orban), had agreed that the company needed to 
either be sold or that it needed to obtain additional capital. Here the company had 
sufficient money to last years before it would have ever run out of money. In Orban. the 
board hired an independent investment banking firm to assist it in finding a purchaser or 
financing. Here, the board hired no one to attempt find another purchaser or additional 
financing - the interested board members performed all of these tasks themselves. In 
Orban. there was never any evidence that the fair value was not had and no one claimed 
that the sale was not in the best interest of the corporation. In Orban. the acts were 
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approved by a fully informed majority of disinterested directors. 
Thus, the Defendants cite to several cases off point to discredit the use of Black-
Scholes in this context. In support of Dr. Kalay's opinion, the Plaintiffs' provided over 8 
pages of citations supporting of the use of Black-Scholes in this context. The test is 
general acceptance in the financial field and not general acceptance by other courts in 
other contexts. 
Given the overwhelming evidence submitted of general acceptance and reliability, 
and the agreement of the Defendants' expert that "The Black-Scholes option pricing 
model . . . may be used in certain instances to provide the value of the equity of a 
company under financial distress," (R. 1982, Ex. W, Grabowski Report, p. 14), the district 
court did not abuse its discretion in denying the SCT Defendants' motion to strike the 
testimony of Dr. Kalay. 
Even if this Court were to strike the affidavit and report of Dr. Kalay, it is clear 
that the Plaintiffs are still entitled to a trial on all of their claims. The cases the 
Defendants cite relate primarily to appraisal actions. Even in an appraisal action, the 
Delaware court specifically stated that "if neither party adduces evidence sufficient to 
satisfy this burden (proving fair value of the shares), "the court must then use its own 
independent judgment to determine fair value." Highfields Capital Ltd. v. AXA Fin.. 
Inc.. 2007 Del. Ch. LEXIS 126, 19-20. 
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On the other causes of action the damages suffered by the Plaintiffs are the value 
of their shares on the date of the merger, plus interest. 
The simple fact that the Plaintiffs owned stock which clearly had a monetary value 
and that the SCT defendants cancelled that stock shows damages. 
III. THE PLAINTIFFS CLEARLY RAISED ISSUES OF FACT ON THE 
BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY CLAIMS. 
In their brief the SCT Defendants assert that they were entitled to summary judgment 
based upon the entire fairness of the transaction. This issue was extensively briefed below 
in a 42 page memorandum and 125 pages of contested facts. (R. 4576, R. 4290). The 
arguments on appeal have not changed. 
American corporate law in every state imposes on corporate directors and officers a 
duty of loyalty and a duty of care. In Delaware, these duties are a matter of common law. 
As fiduciary for the corporation, the board of directors owes a duty of undivided loyalty to 
the corporation at all times. Directors and officers must "act loyally and in good faith 
without assuming any position in conflict with the interests of the corporation." Bergeson v. 
Life Insurance Corporation of America. 265 F.2d 227, 232 (10th Cir. 1959). This Court has 
stated, 
"There is no doubt that one who is elected as an officer or director of 
a corporation accepts a fiduciary responsibility to serve the interests of 
those who elect him which he must discharge with fidelity and which 
he should not desert for his own gain." 
Cox v. Berry. 19 Utah 2d 352, 431 P. 2d 575 (1967). 
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In the context of a proposed sale of the corporation, the content of the duty of loyalty 
becomes clear and mandatory. In the seminal case, Revlon. Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes 
Holdings, Inc.. 506 A. 2d 173 (1985), the Delaware Supreme Court held that when the sale 
of the company becomes inevitable, the sole duty of the directors is to maximize the value 
that the shares will receive in the sale transaction. 
In their brief the SCT Defendants argue that there was no evidence of an unfair price 
and no evidence of unfair dealing. The price Mr. Borghetti received, zero, as set forth above 
was clearly unfair. 
As to unfair dealing the record is replete with instances of the unfairness. 
The Campus Pipeline directors had extensive economic interests in the transaction that 
were at odds with those of the corporation and its shares. 
The financial interests of the officers and directors in endorsing the transaction, 
regardless of its merits, are obvious: 
a. Thomas Lewis served as Chairman of the Board of Directors and Chief 
Executive Officer of CPI. He received an executive retention payment of 
approximately $736,550 in addition to a $787,500 termination fee in 
connection with the merger. 
b. Darin Gilson served as President, Chief Operating Officer and Director of CPI, 
and he received a retention bonus of approximately $834,756 in connection 
with the merger. 
c. Fred Harman was a director of CPI and a member of the "special committee" that 
recommended the merger. Harman received compensation in connection with the 
merger. Harman was also a managing partner at Oak Investment Partners, which was 
a preferred shareholder of Campus Pipeline, with interests in direct conflict to those 
of the common stock. 
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David Peterschmidt was a director of CPI and a member of the "special 
committee" that recommended the merger. Peterschmidt received 
compensation in connection with the merger. Peterschmidt was also a 
preferred shareholder of Campus Pipeline, with interests in direct conflict to 
those of the common stock. 
David Gardner was a director of CPI and a member of the "special committee" 
that recommended the merger. Although he was not an employee of Campus 
Pipeline at the time of the merger, he received retention bonuses of 
approximately $137,489 in connection with the merger. 
Chad Muir was a director of CPI. Although he was not an employee of 
Campus Pipeline at the time of the merger, he received retention bonuses of 
approximately $137,489 in connection with the merger. 
Eric Haskell was a director of CPI and received compensation in connection 
with the merger. 
Michael Chamberlain was a director of CPI and received compensation in 
connection with the merger. 
Allen Friedman was a director of CPI and received compensation in 
connection with the merger. 
Darin Gilson served as President, Chief Operating Officer and Director of 
CPI, and he received a retention bonus of approximately $834,756 in 
connection with the merger. 
David Murray served as Vice President and Chief Technology Officer of 
CPI. Murray received severance payments of approximately $117,848 in 
connection with the merger. 
Andy Cooley served as Senior Vice President of CPI, and received a 
retention bonus of approximately $491,033 in connection with the merger. 
In addition, Cooley was later employed by SCT following the merger. 
Scott Doughman served as Vice President of Strategy and Corporate 
Development of CPI, and received a retention bonus of approximately 
-14-
$491,033 in connection with the merger. In addition, Doughman was later 
employed by SCT following the merger. 
n. John Dunn served as Vice President of CPI, and received a retention bonus 
of approximately $491,033 in connection with the merger. 
o. Tyler Thatcher served as Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of CPI, 
and received a retention bonus of approximately $491,033 in connection 
with the merger. 
(R. 4576, p. 14-17) 
Given the extensive conflicting interests of the Campus Pipeline directors and 
officers, they had a special obligation to be fully informed themselves, and to fully inform 
the common shareholders, as to the merits of the transaction. Smith v. Van Gorkum. 488 
A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). This duty they did not meet. 
The only "outside" opinion they commissioned was from Thomas Weisel Partners 
- which was not an outsider at all. Thomas Weisel Partners was a preferred shareholder 
of Campus Pipeline and therefore had a strong conflict of interest with the Campus 
Pipeline common stock: As a preferred shareholder, Thomas Weisel Partners stood to 
lose if Campus Pipeline were to pursue a risky, entrepreneurial course of action and 
failed, while if Campus Pipeline were to succeed, the bulk of the upside would go to the 
common stock. (R. 4576 17-18; R. 4290, at Tf491, 492). Moreover, just in case this 
conflict of interest was not enough to skew Thomas Weisel Partners' judgment, the 
Campus Pipeline fiduciaries saw fit to give Thomas Weisel Partners yet another conflict 
of interest: they made Thomas Weisel Partners' fee partially contingent on the 
completion of the merger. (Id.). 
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Moreover, even if Thomas Weisel Partners could have overcome the inherent 
conflict of interest in its evaluation of the transaction, the terms of its engagement 
precluded it from doing so. The directors directed Thomas Weisel Partners to ignore the 
only relevant question: whether the transaction was fair and advantageous to Campus 
Pipeline's common stock. The answer to this question is obvious: the transaction 
provided no benefit to the common stock and therefore could not have been in their 
interest so long as any shred of hope of continuing the business remained. Thomas 
Weisel Partners, however, did not consider this issue. Accordingly, its opinion is 
worthless. (R. 4290, at ^429-432). 
In short, Thomas Weisel Partners' advice to the board was not the result of an 
independent evaluation (even by a conflicted advisor) but rather was determined entirely 
by the terms of its assignment. 
The deposition testimony of defendants Harman and Doughman, as well as the 
terms of the assignment to Thomas Weisel Partners, make clear that the directors ignored 
their duty of loyalty to act solely in the interests of the common stock. Thus, director 
Harman testified: 
a. "We were working on behalf of the entire shareholder group, not just one 
class, common or preferred." (R. 3957 at HH, 71). 
b. The board was working to get best value for "the company" rather than the 
common stock. (R. 3957 at HH, 62) 
c. He had a duty to all stakeholders not only the common stock. (R. 3957 at 
HH, 168) 
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d. He sought to "balance" the interests of different stakeholders, not simply to 
promote the interests of the common stock. (R. 3957 at HH, 171). 
His duty, however, was to work for common shareholders alone. Harman was 
aware that the proposed transaction would wipe out the value of the common stock. {Id., 
at pp. 71, 185). In light of the conflict of interest between common stock and other 
investors, his decision to pursue this transaction because it was in the interests of other 
stakeholders is a clear, intentional, violation of the Revlon rule. 
Had the directors been working in the interests of the common shareholders, they 
would have considered and adopted alternative courses of action, any of which would 
have been preferable to common shareholders to sale to SCT, which merely ensured that 
they would receive the worst possible outcome, a certain payment of zero. 
Thus, Harman testified that Campus Pipeline had enough cash to last for another 
year. (R. 3957 at HH, 68). From the perspective of the common stock, continuing to 
operate the company would have allowed for search for alternative sources of cash, 
including increased sale or an alternative investor, thus keeping open the possibility of a 
return on their investment. Harman, however, testified that the board was not looking for 
more cash at that time. (R. 3957 at HH, 68, 87). Doughman testified that Campus 
Pipeline had only to lay off twenty employees to become profitable and that after making 
those layoffs the company was indeed breaking even. (R. 3572 at CC, 39-40). Moreover, 
the Campus Pipeline business was on an "upward trajectory". (R. 3957 at HH, 114-15). 
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The clear interest of the common stock, then, would have been to continue the 
business, not to sell for no value. 
Similarly, a board interested in pursuing the interests of the common stock would 
have pursued alternative transactions that might have provided value to the Campus 
Pipeline common stock. Harman also admits the possibility of an alternative transaction, 
with Oak Partners, that was not pursued. (R. 3957 at HH, 76). 
Revlon and its progeny in Delaware and elsewhere make clear that once a board 
has decided that the sale of the company is inevitable, its sole duty is to maximize the 
return to the common shareholders. The facts asserted in opposition to the motions for 
summary judgment demonstrate that the Campus Pipeline directors and officers viewed 
their job differently. Harman explicitly stated, and their actions clearly demonstrate, that 
they viewed their obligations as, at most, to "balance" the interests of different Campus 
Pipeline constituencies, including its customer SCT and, most importantly, themselves. 
In this case, as discussed above, the Plaintiffs asserted facts showing that the 
directors failed to consider alternative transactions, failed to exercise their business 
judgment in the interests of the common stock, and specifically instructed their outside 
consultant, Thomas Weisel Partners, to assume the very result it needed to consider, 
namely whether the sale of Campus Pipeline to SCT was the best available course of 
action from the perspective of Campus Pipeline's common stock. The directors and 
officers sold Campus Pipeline to SCT in a transaction from which they benefitted but 
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which gave no value whatsoever to the common stock. It was hardly an arms-length 
transaction arrived at through fair dealing for a fair price. 
The cases cited are easily distinguished. In the unpublished decision of Blackmore 
Partners. L.P. v. Link Energy, LLC. 2005 WL 2709639 (Del.Ch. 2005), the corporation 
had just emerged from bankruptcy. Here there is no evidence that the company was 
anywhere near bankruptcy and had millions of dollars of cash on hand. Link, before 
selling itself, first sold non strategic assets in order to stay in business. Here, there is no 
evidence of any attempt to sell assets or obtain financing or do anything else prior to sale, 
because, of course, Campus Pipeline had millions in the bank at the time of sale. Link 
hired independent outside advisors to assist it in finding capital. Link's special committee 
was clearly independent. It was undisputed that Link was insolvent at all relevant times, 
unlike Campus Pipeline. The Link corporate charter did not entitle the common 
shareholders (unit holders) to vote on the sale of substantially all of Link's assets - here 
different voting rules applied. In Link business prospects were declining, but Campus 
Pipeline's prospects were on the rise. In Link, the board of directors owed a fiduciary 
duty to the note-holders because of insolvency — no such duty was owed here, indeed, the 
board's paramount duty was to the common shareholders. 
IV. THE ATTORNEYS CONTENTION THAT THEY DID NOT HAVE AN 
ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP IS DISPUTED BY NUMEROUS FACTS 
As was extensively briefed below, (R. 4608-4627) whether Bendinger Crockett 
and Mr. Borghetti had an attorney client relationship is a question of fact for the jury. 
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In Kilpatrick v. Wiley. Rein & Fielding, 37 P.3d 1130 (Utah 2001), this Court was faced 
with whether an implied attorney-client relationship had been established between the members 
and the counsel for the company. The Court stated: 
[T]he proper determination of whether an implied attorney-client relationship 
exists hinges on whether the party had a reasonable belief that it was represented. 
. . in making the determination of whether an implied attorney-client relationship 
existed, one factor to consider is the attorney's direct involvement in the party's 
legal interests 
(Id. at 1139-1140) 
In Roderick v. Ricks, 54 P.3d 1119 (Utah 2002), this Court stated that, "in order for a 
person to reasonably believe that an attorney represents the person, (1) the person must 
subjectively believe the attorney represents him or her and (2) this subjective belief must be 
reasonable under the circumstances." (Id. at 1124, internal citations omitted). 
Here, there is no doubt that "advice" and "assistance" were "both sought and received". 
In the Plaintiffs' Statement of Disputed and Additional Facts (R. 4290), the relationship 
between Jeffery Williams and Mr. Borghetti is detailed in paragraphs 156-190. In those 
pargraphs Mr. Borghetti identifies numerous meetings, emails, telephone calls and face to face 
meetings during which Mr. Williams and Mr. Borghetti discussed the possible claims, including 
appraisals, the potential for damages, the fee arrangement possibilities, Delaware law, the 
business judgment rule, and a multitude of other related topics. In addition, Mr. Williams told 
Mr. Borghetti he wanted to hire an expert to value the claim (167); told Mr. Borghetti to write a 
letter to SCT demanding appraisal rights for the shares (168); told Mr. Borghetti that the fraud 
and breach of fiduciary duty claims were better than an appraisal (171); and he requested and 
received Mr. Borghetti's original and only copy of the documents necessary to pursue the claims 
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(178). Mr. Borghetti believed he had an attorney client relationship with Mr. Williams and his 
firm. (198). Only after the statute of limitations had passed by months did Mr. Williams send 
Mr. Borghetti a letter stating he was not going to pursue the case. (189). 
Despite months of discussions, the hiring of valuation experts, the discussion of fee 
arrangements, the taking of possession of the only copy of the file and its retention until after the 
statute of limitations passed, the Bendinger Crockett Defendants assert no attorney client 
relationship existed. There was clearly as issue of fact for the jury and there is no basis for 
affirming dismissal on any other ground. 
There are facts in dispute as to whether Borghetti had the legal sophistication to 
understand how to file when to file or perfect his appraisal. In paragraphs 201 through 220 
demonstrate that Mr. Borghetti believed that Mr. Williams was his lawyer and that Mr. Williams 
was staying on top of the entire case including any appraisal action. The facts alleged also 
dispute the contention that Mr. Borghetti knew he had 120 days to file. 
The Defendants' contention that Mr. Parson's told Mr. Borghetti of the deadline does not 
relieve them of the duty to file. More importantly, the fact is disputed. In paragraph 187, it is 
clear that Mr. Borghetti was not relying on Mr. Parsons and had ceased seeking attorneys other 
than Mr. Williams. Further, Mr. Parson's told Borghetti that he was not a litigator, had no 
litigation experience, and was unfamiliar with Delaware law. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court below erred in simply looking at Professor Kalay's calculation of 
market value and holding such figures to be the "end all, be all" in this action. Instead, 
the Court below should have focused on the "fair value" damage calculation from 
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Professor Kalay. The denial of the motion to strike the affidavit of Dr. Kalay was not an 
abuse of discretion. The damages calculation is equally applicable to the other causes of 
action. That fair value damage calculation clearly and undoubtedly shows that Plaintiffs 
suffered damages of between $4.2 million and $6,706 million. Respectfully, the 
Appellants request that both Summary Judgment Orders and Judgments be vacated and 
reversed and the case remanded for trial below. 
Dated this t ? day of February, 2008 
Curtis L. Wenger, 
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
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PROOF OF SERVICE 
I am a citizen of the United States and employed in Salt Lake County, Utah. 
I am over the age of eighteen years and not a party to the within-entitled action. My 
business address is City Centre I, 175 East 400 South, Suite 900, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84111. I am readily familiar with this firm's practice for collection and processing of 
correspondence for mailing with the United States' Postal Service, Federal Express and 
hand delivery. On August 12, 2004,1 placed for delivery via U.S. Mail two true and 
correct copies of the within document, APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF in a sealed 
envelope, to the following: 
John iJearce 
JONES WALDO HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH PC 
170 South Main Street Suite 1500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Stuart Schultz 
Strong & Hanni 
3 Triad Center Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84180 
And, one original and nine copies of APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF were 
served, 
[ ] via United States Mail, first-class postage prepaid, to: 
[ ] via hand delivery 
to the Clerk of the Utah Supreme Court 
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I declare that I am employed in the office of an attorney that has been 
admitted to this Court at whose direction the service was made. 
Executed on February 5, 2008at Salt Lake City, Utah. 
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